Weak realism, counterfactuals, and decay of geometry at small scales by Tresser, Charles
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
02
00
7v
1 
 1
 F
eb
 2
00
5
Weak realism, counterfactuals, and decay of geometry at small scales
Charles Tresser∗
IBM, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, U.S.A.
(Dated: November 13, 2018)
Two typical entanglements will be shown to stand on opposite sides on the issue of instrumental
realism, the issue of whether (as for EPR in the original form or EPRB, Bohm’s versions using spin)
or not (as for GHZ) observables have values that preexist measurement. Instrumental realism in the
EPR context helps us prove that in some special circumstances, one can get simultaneous knowledge
of two conjugate quantities, which in particular make sense together. This shatters the axiomatic
presentation of Quantum Mechanics. This simultaneous knowledge of two conjugate quantities is an
elaboration on 1935 work by Schro¨dinger, hence the name, Schro¨dinger Unorthodoxy Theorem, given
to the second main result that is obtained with little effort from the result on instrumental realism.
Once the axiomatic edifice of Quantum Mechanics is broken, we can let go the completeness of the
wave function as suggested in EPR, and like Einstein “absolutely hold fast” on locality. The EPR
paper of mid-1935 gets here contrasted, from a new point of view, with a 1936 text by Einstein where
Einstein avoids using counterfactuals. Counterfactuals get a precise definition and the corresponding
concept is used all along, but may be new under an old name. We provide a short critical review
of Bell’s 1964 paper. Then, a small modification of arguments for the Schro¨dinger Unorthodoxy
Theorem will let appear a simple conservation law, combined with the Malus Law, as the origin
of the correlation in Bell’s version of EPRB: this is our third main result. As the fourth main
result, a last use of the concept of counterfactual yields the decay of geometry at small enough
scale. This opens a new world of interpretation of aspects of Quantum Mechanics, aspects that
range from measurement and the need of classical physics to views on what realism should mean in
microphysics.
1: INTRODUCTION
The word entanglement, but not the concept, was ap-
parently first used in the context of Quantum Mehanics
(or QM ) by Schro¨dinger in [1], arguably the first sig-
nificant article about the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (or
EPR) paper [2], written to continue in the line of thought
of [2] rather than attack it. It is well documented (see
[3], [4]) that just after the publication of [2], Schro¨dinger
shared with Einstein his amusement at watching the dis-
array of the other QM gurus confronted with that paper,
and got in exchange Einstein’s private own view on the
issues covered by [2], a view somewhat different from
what Podolsky had written as the acting author of that
historical paper. After expounding the central role of en-
tanglements in QM, Schro¨dinger mentions in [1], the fact
that two conjugate variables can be known on a single
particle but in a rather cryptic way (see also accounts on
this paper in [3] and [5]).
In [6] pp. 681-682, about the dispute with the QM or-
thodox views about EPR, and after telling us that Bohr
had the best perspective among the orthodoxes, Einstein
(who began using the word “paradox” in contexts like
in [2] years before the published version, and used ψ-
function for the wave-function) writes (throughout the
paper, I use square brackets to provide context that help
make sense of the cited texts and I always reproduce ital-
ics and quotation marks exactly as in the quoted source
when they are on parts of the quotation) :
“Translated into my own way of putting it, he [Niels
Bohr] argues as follows:
If the partial systems A and B form a total system
which is described by its ψ-function ψ(AB), there is no
reason why any mutually independent existence (state
of reality) should be ascribed to the partial systems A
and B viewed separately, not even if the partial systems
are spatially separated from each other at the particular
time under consideration. The assertion that, in this
latter case, the real situation of Bcould not be (directly)
influenced by any measurement taken on A is, therefore
within the framework of quantum theory, unfounded and
(as the paradox shows) unacceptable.
By this way of looking at the matter it becomes evi-
dent that the paradox forces us to relinquish one of the
following two assertions:
(1) the description by means of the ψ-function is com-
plete
(2) the real states of spatially separated objects are in-
dependent of each other.
In the other hand, it is possible to adhere to (2), if one
regards the ψ-function as the description of a (statisti-
cal) ensemble of systems (and therefore relinquish (1)).
However, this view blasts the framework of the “orthodox
quantum theory.” ”
So is the (1)vs(2) alternative set by Einstein. On this
very alternative, Einstein clearly chose (2). In the same
book [6] as just cited (but in the first volume in the two
volumes editions), he wrote p. 85:
“But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, abso-
lutely hold fast: the real factual situation of the system
2S2 is independent of what is done with the system S1,
which is spatially separated from the former.”
Bell accepted this alternative. But, as clearly as Einstein
had chosen to relinquish (1), Bell chose to relinquish (2)
[8] (see also [9] or [10] that contain respectively reprints
and new prints of most of the papers of Bell that are re-
lated to the foundations of QM) while Rosen who chose to
relinquish (1) in 1935 [2], chose to relinquish (2) in 1985
in a paper [7] about [2]. The way I understand it, Rosen’s
late choice and Bell’s choice are both due to the same de-
cision to follow what classical QM dictates in the choice
(1)vs(2). Notice that long range changes in the wave
function by virtue of conservation of the norm are not the
issue, as they are linked to the obvious lack of Lorentz in-
variance of non-relativistic QM: it is what would remain
a problem in any relativistic QM that is concerned when
one speaks about the locality vs non-locality issue. Each
of Einstein, Rosen, and Bell understood clearly about
relinquishing (1) that, “this view blasts the framework
of the “orthodox quantum theory.” I believe (and this
strongly motivates the present work) that, if a violation
of QM as strong as Schro¨dinger’s statement in [1] that
two conjugate variables can be known on a single particle
can be further justified, this leaves no serious reason to
support (2) over (1). Unfortunately, recent good sense
based arguments for supporting (2) that I know about
(see for instance [11] and [12]) are formulated without
even mentioning the (1)vs(2) alternative. However, the
simplest Bell type theorem presented in [13] allows one
to get false inequalities as in previously known Bell type
theorems, but with no room for any effect of non-locality,
all being due to counterfactuals: this provides another
strong argument to fully abandon non-locality.
The paper is organised as follows:
- A short description of the so-called EPR and GHZ (for
Greenberger, Horne, Zeilinger: [14]) entanglements
(the later in the 3 particles form proposed by Mer-
min [15]: see also [16]) is given in Section 2. I
also discuss there EPRB, the Bohm version [17] of
EPR where one considers the spin of spin- 12 parti-
cles along two orthogonal axes.
- Discussions of the method of rejection of conclusions
from counterfactual experiments and about which
kind of realism one needs when studying entangle-
ments are presented in Section 3 where I also re-
port on Einstein’s own discussion of the EPR issue,
and present remarks on the EPR paper itself and
its links to counterfactuals, some of which may be
new.
- This is more than I need to allow me to restate and fur-
ther justify in Section 4 the heretic behavior of EPR
particles pointed out by Schro¨dinger in [1] (see also
[18]), in what I call the Schro¨dinger Unorthodoxy
Theorem (or Claim 2). More precisely, after argu-
ing to justify weak realism (mostly the fact that a
precise form of realism holds true in the EPR con-
text), I will show that such realism leads almost
immediately to the Schro¨dinger Unorthodoxy The-
orem.
- I next briefly discuss in Section 5 Bell’s extension to
arbitrary angles of EPRB, (and correlatively of the
Bohm-Aharonov version [19] that deals with the
polarization of photons rather than with the spin
of spin- 12 particles).
- A small adaptation of the argument for the Schro¨dinger
Unorthodoxy Theorem then allows me to provide
in Section 6 a conservation-law-based justification
of the correlations that QM predicts in Bell’s ex-
tension of EPRB.
- After so fighting aspects of QM orthodoxy, and Bell’s
ruling clan, I will back-up in Section 7 one of the
most controversial stands of the Copenhagen Inter-
pretation, in fact what Bell may have hated most
in the classical views (while he backed strongly the
classical stand on the issue raised in [2]). Using the
method of rejection of conclusions from counter-
factual experiments, I will defend that the need for
classical physics to found quantum physics comes
from the very fact that geometry does not make any
physical sense at small enough scale. This decay
of physically meaningful geometry at small enough
scale is a trivially established thesis as we will see;
however it justifies the very non-trivial fact, based
on the Uncertainty Principle, that coordinates do
not make classical sense for particles.
2: TWO GEDANKEN EXPERIMENTS THAT
HAVE MADE IT TO THE LAB
2.1: The (gedanken) experiments of the EPR type.
The entanglements in what I call the EPR case in this
paper will be 2-particles states that cannot be written
as tensor products. Particles whose states were known
before a known interaction and that get separated after
the interaction are good examples. This includes pairs
created from energy such as electron-positron pairs that
will be our standard examples all along (hence the e and
p symbols). The entangled state describes the global
system after the particles have separated, to become sys-
tems I and II. I will let uα(x1) (where x1 stands for the
the variables used to describe the system I) represent the
eigenvectors of some observable A for system I. Depend-
ing on whether one has a discrete spectrum (as in the case
of the spin along some direction ~a as suggested by Bohm
who considers spins along two orthogonal directions) or
3a continuous spectrum (as in the case of momentum fol-
lowing [2]), the wave function can be written as follows:
In the discrete case: Following [2], let a1, a2, a3, · · · be
the eigenvalues of some physical quantity A per-
taining to system I and u1(x1), u2(x1), u3(x1), · · ·
be the corresponding eigenfunctions, with x1 stand-
ing for the variable used to describe system I. Then
Podolsky tells us that Ψ, considered as a function
of x1 can be expressed as
Ψ(x1, x2) = Σ
∞
n=1ψn(x2)un(x1) , (1)
where x2 stands for the the variables used to de-
scribe the system II. Here the ψn(x2)’s are to be
merely regarded as the coefficients of the expansion
of Ψ into a series of orthogonal functions un(x1).
ByWave Packet Reduction (WPR), if the quantity
A is measured to ak, then the wave function of sys-
tem I is given by uk(x1) and system II is left in
the state with wave function ψk(x2), and Podolsky
also notices that the set of functions un(x1) is de-
termined by the choice of the physical quantity A
(leaving implicit that the ψn(x2)’s also depend on
the choice of A).
However, still following [2] (see p. 779):
“If, instead of this, we had chosen another quantity,
say B”
(which may in particular be an observable con-
jugate to A) having the eigenvalues b1, b2, b3, · · ·
and v1(x1), v2(x1), v3(x1), · · · as the corresponding
eigenfunctions, we would have obtained
Ψ(x1, x2) = Σ
∞
n=1φm(x2)vm(x1) , (2)
instead of Equation 1 for the Ψ function, with the
φm’s as the new coefficients. Then, if B is measured
to be bj , we conclude from WPR that after the
measurement system I is left in the state given by
vij(x1) and that system II is left in the state with
wave function φj(x2).
This sets the stage for either accepting an incom-
plete description by the wave function or admitting
the lack of locality, but this is classical material that
I will not revisit in details: I need merely the set-
ting since the strategy will be to try improving on
[1] (which has not been too often tried) rather than
having one more frontal attack along the line of [2].
In the case of the spin of spin- 12 particles (a configu-
ration often called EPRB in the literature), follow-
ing Bohm [17] I will consider the so-called singlet
state (see, e.g., [17], p. 400) that is rotation invari-
ant and given by:
Ψ(x1, x2) =
1√
2
(|+〉1 ⊗ |−〉2 − |−〉1 ⊗ |+〉2) , (3)
and there is a corresponding case for photon po-
larization that is more practical for experiment but
that will not be used here [19]. The singlet state is
particularly simple because, since it gets the same
expression in any orthogonal basis, WPR analysis
allows one to readily see that the two particles in-
herit opposite signs. Notice that in this case, the
spins along orthogonal axes provide an example of
conjugate observable leading to exactly analogous
Ψ functions.
In the continuous case: For instance (using an exam-
ple from [2]), assume that systems I and II are two
particles in one dimensional motion and that:
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∫
∞
−∞
e
2pii
h
(x1−x2+x0)pdp , (4)
where x0 is some constant. Using then the momen-
tum of the first particle as the first observable A,
the eigenfunctions of A will be
up(x1) = e
2pii
h
px1 .
Thus, being now in the continuous spectrum case,
one gets instead of Equation 1:
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∫
∞
−∞
ψp(x2)up(x1)dp , (5)
where
ψp(x2) = e
−2pii
h
(x2−x0)p ,
and we notice that ψp(x2) is the eigenfunction of
the operator
P = (
h
2πi
)
∂x2
∂
,
corresponding to the eigenvalue −p of the momen-
tum of the second particle.
On the other hand, if now B is taken as the coor-
dinate of the particle that constitutes system I, it
has for eigenfunction
vx(x− 1) = δ(x1 − x) ,
corresponding to the eigenvalue x, where we have
used δ for the Dirac delta-function. Equation 2 in
this case is replaced by
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∫
∞
−∞
φx(x2)xx(x1)dp ,
where
φx(x2) =
∫
∞
−∞
e
−2pii
h
(x−x2+x0)pdp = hδ(x− x2 + x0) .
4This φx is now the eigenfunction of the operator
Q = x2 corresponding to the eigenvalue x + x0 for
the coordinate of the particle that constitutes sys-
tem II.
At this point of the discussion in [2], Podolsky then
uses the fact that A and B are conjugate observ-
ables in what seems to me to be a counterfactual-
based reasoning, based on his use of “If, instead of
this, we had chosen another quantity, say B”, lo-
cality, and elements of reality (but see Subsection
3.4, and above all, see [2] pp.779-780).
I assume symmetry (total spin zero, total momentum
zero, etc.,) except otherwise stated (as we have done im-
plicitly above, by not imposing x0 = 0), although sym-
metry is not necessary but often simplifies the discus-
sion. Aspect of symmetry may signify constraints that
are (too) hard to enforce, in particular because of the
Uncertainty Principle, as would be for instance imposing
x0 = 0 in Equation 4 above.
As for spin, like Bohm in 1951 [17], in the EPR con-
text I will first only consider measurements of the singlet
state described by Equation 3 along two axis, say x and
z, orthogonal to each other and to the axis y of propaga-
tion. Later, starting in Section 5 (after a brief comment
in Section 4, following Remark 8) the “x and z only”
constraint is to be relaxed, following the work of Bell [8].
In the present theoretical paper, I will mostly ignore the
1957 suggestion in [19] to replace the spin of spin- 12 parti-
cles by photons polarizations as is done in most if not all
actual EPR experiments (see for instance [20], [21] and
references therein).
2.2: The (gedanken) experiments of the GHZ type.
The GHZ setting is a type of entanglement different
from what one studies in the EPR context. Initially
conceived with 4 particles [14], such entanglements were
built to show that the so called Einstein local realism,
a concept forged to be proved naively wrong, was in-
deed more obviously wrong (with “‘more” in the sense
of “without calling upon statistics”) that could be sup-
posedly established by Bell inequalities [8]. Further en-
tanglements of the GHZ type were later conceived with 3
particles [15], [16]. I use the version in [15] that has made
it to the lab and to textbooks (see, e.g., pp. 152-153 in
[22] or pp. 186-190 in [23]). Restricting to the spin part,
the state that one considers reads:
Ψ(x1, x2, x3) =
1√
2
(|+〉1 ⊗ |+〉2 ⊗ |+〉3 − |−〉1 ⊗ |−〉2 ⊗ |−〉3) . (6)
The three particles of this GHZ state (6) travel out from
near (0, 0, 0) in the plane y = 0, with the particle la-
belled k ∈ {1, 2, 3} going approximately along the half-
line starting at the origin and making an angle 2kπ/3
with some reference half-line in the plane y = 0. For
each k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and w ∈ {x, y, z}, σw(k) is the spin
operator along the axis w(k), where:
- y(k) ≡ y is the vertical axis, oriented positively up-
ward,
- z(k) is the axis along which particle k travels,
- x(k) is orthogonal to y and z(k) and oriented posi-
tively counterclockwise.
We have for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
σx(k)|+〉k = |−〉k σx(k)|−〉k = |+〉k ,
σy(k)|+〉k = i|−〉k σy(k)|−〉k = −i|+〉k .
Then, Ψ(x1, x2, x3) is:
- E(+)) An eigenvector for each of σx(1)σy(2)σy(3),
σy(1)σx(2)σy(3), and σy(1)σy(2)σx(3) with eigenvalue 1,
- E(-)) An eigenvector for σx(1)σx(2)σx(3) with eigen-
value -1.
From this one can easily deduce two facts formalized in
the following easy lemmas:
Lemma 1 The quantities that are measured by the
σy(k)’s cannot be known before the corresponding mea-
surements are performed.
Proof of Lemma 1 For otherwise, one could predict the
values sx(k) that would be measured by all of the σx(k)’s.
But then, denoting respectively by sy(k) the supposedly
known values of the measurements σy(k), by E(+):
sx(1)sy(2)sy(3) = sy(1)sx(2)sy(3) = sy(1)sy(2)sx(3) = 1 ,
which using:
sy(1)
2 = sy(2)
2 = sy(3)
2 = 1 ,
yields:
sx(1)sx(2)sx(3) = 1 . (7)
Since E(-) reads:
sx(1)sx(2)sx(3) = −1 , (8)
5the comparison of Equations (7) and (8) provides the con-
tradiction that we seek to conclude the proof. More pre-
cisely, this proves that not all the σy(k)’s can be known
before measurement is performed: the rest is by symme-
try over the indices, assuming that all the future decisions
are equally possible.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 The quantities that are measured by the
σx(k)’s cannot be known before the corresponding mea-
surements are performed.
Proof of Lemma 2 For otherwise, denoting the pre-
existing values of the measurements σx(k) respectively by
sx(k), assume that some first measurement σy(j) is per-
formed. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
j = 1, with a result sy(1) for the measurement. Then
by E(+) we would be able to predict with certainty the
values sy(2) and sy(3) respectively for the measurements
σy(2) and σy(3), from which the same contradiction as
obtained above for the previous lemma follows readily.
This proves that not all the σx(k)’s can be known before
measurement is performed: the rest is by symmetry over
the indices, assuming again that all the future decisions
are equally possible.
Q.E.D.
These two lemmas are enough to show that realism
in the sense of Definition 2 below is not true in general,
but I notice that a small modification of the arguments
(one just has to consider all possible outcomes) yields the
following stronger result:
Theorem 1 The quantities that are measured by the
σy(k)’s and the σx(k)’s cannot make sense before mea-
surement is performed.
Like in the case of EPR, experiments have been done
on the GHZ entanglement: see for instance [24] and ref-
erences therein. Some statistical analysis of the GHZ
experiments, which take serious account of the less than
perfect performance of the captors, such as [25] and [26]
and the critical papers responding to these attacks on pa-
per that are more in the line of the work of Bell will not
be considered here, and neither will other entanglements
such as in [27].
After the above treatment of aspects of GHZ was writ-
ten, I had the privilege to have a discussion with Itamar
Pitowsky. I then learned from Itamar of the paper [28]
which discusses the relation between the statements:
“Every time I measure A I get the result a”
and
“The value of A is a”.
and which uses the same context of GHZ that I have used
here. The reader will immediately notice that [28] and
the present section are strongly related. There is however
enough of difference in the issues and in the conclusions
for me to stick to the text above rather than providing
a commented reference to that previous work. Further-
more, [28] claims to show that:
“Every time I measure A I get the result a”
6⇒
“The value of A is a”.
but the proof, which uses the context of GHZ, does that
in a counterfactual way which may be at best irrelevant
for our purpose in the present paper. I must say that
the discussion that I had (and during which I was in-
troduced by my interlocutor to further quite fascinating
work of his) was closer to my understanding than what
I can read from [28]. I may well misunderstand [28], or
Itamar Pitowski may have projected upon me his present
understanding of a problem that he dealt with 15 years
ago. In particular I understood from Pitowsky that he
does not accept now) the sort of action at a distance that
is the trademark of the type of strong non-locality that
the present paper aims at getting rid of. To the contrary,
one of the first claims of [28] is about establishing such
strong non-locality in the GHZ context. I will need to
comment again on [28] later on: see Remark 7 in Subsec-
tion 4.1.
3: COUNTERFACTUALS, SOME EPR
DISCUSSIONS, AND A NOMENCLATURE FOR
INSTRUMENTAL REALISM
3.1: Counterfactuals.
Definition 1 I loosely define counterfactual gendanken
experiments (or simply counterfactuals) as thought ex-
periments that cannot be performed because performing
them would violate Physics (like getting back in time to
redo an experiment; a different example will be discussed
later).
Notice that the word “counterfactual” is used in the lit-
erature with a different sense, and it seems in fact with
several other senses. The definition given here is the one
that I find most useful. During a lecture that I had the
pleasure and privilege to give at the Technion on January
9, 2005 (a few day after Asher Peres passed away), Petra
Scudo and others in the audience resented my use of the
word counterfactual. In fact so evideently that I kept
the same definition but created an onomatopoeia begin-
ning by “counter’ and ending in a funny sound in order
to go on with my lecture rather than get sidetracked:
readers who have strong feelings about what the word
“counterfactual” should mean can thus replace any fur-
ther occurrence of this word by the word “blip”: I am
not yet ready to quit the fight on what the word should
mean. The fact that counterfactual experiments can lead
to non-physical conclusions is rather obvious. That
“such reasoning are like proofs based on wrong figures in
geometry: at best one cannot trust the result”,
6is a remark that was made to me by Ed Spiegel when I
told him that I had began to realize that gedanken ex-
periments should be classified according to being doable
or not, and further:
- Discriminated according to the theory (or family of
theories) to be tested.
- Or considered as absolute (or q-absolute with “q”
standing here for quasi) meaning that the judgement of
being doable would be made against all accepted theories.
There are many ways in which a gedanken experiment
can be counterfactual, some of which being more prone
than others to occur accidentally. For instance playing
with “either this or that”, one may easily unwillingly gen-
erate the counterfactual to Quantum Mechanics consist-
ing in redoing a given experiment, at least in principle.
3.2: Einstein’s own discussion of the EPR setting
The declared intent of the EPR paper [2] was to prove
the incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics in the follow-
ing very precise sense (whatever bigger goal each of the
authors had, if any):
(*) the quantum-mechanical description of physical real-
ity given by wave functions is not complete.
Here, the words “physical reality” should be taken in
their usual non-technical sense, despite the controversial
definition in [2] of elements of physical reality, on which
I come back below. The EPR paper disputably failed to
establish (*), even if one accepts its hypothesis and new
concepts, because the arguments used a counterfactual.
This is something that one should not put too hard to
Podolsky’s charge because that concept was not mastered
then. In fact, Bell makes more serious errors of that sort
in his historical paper [8] written 27 years later: see the
critics to this effect in [29], a paper published in 1972
(see also the short account of [29] in [3], p. 312, where
[29] is cited in its preprint form as [30]). Of course, the
hypothesis of [2] have also been severely contested, as I
discuss at length in the present paper.
In Einstein’s own words from 1936, taken from the
reprinted form on p. 317 of [31] (see also the much later
text pp. 83-87 in [6]):
[in the EPR entanglement situation] “Let us now de-
termine the physical state of the partial system A as
completely as possible by measurements. Then quantum
mechanics allows us to determine the ψ function of the
partial system B from the measurement made, and from
the ψ function of the total system [known since the initial
ψ function is assumed to be known, by Schro¨dinger equa-
tion]. This determination, however, gives a result which
depends upon which of the quantities (observables) of A
have been measured (for instance, coordinates or mo-
menta). Since there can be only one physical state of B
after the interaction which cannot reasonably be consid-
ered to depend on the peculiar measurement we perform
on the system A separated from B it may be concluded
that the ψ function in not unambiguously coordinated to
the physical state”.
From which (*) readily follows if one does not question
the validity of the locality hypothesis (2).
My own view is that locality, makes no physical sense
at small enough scale, as will follow from the discussion
in the last section. However, like Einstein, Omne`s [11],
and Griffiths [12] for instance, I believe that it does hold
true at the scale relevant for the EPR discussion, to the
contrary of what is believed in Bell’s camp (but I got the
impression that the introduction of information theoreti-
cal concepts - see, e.g., [32] - is slowly transforming some
believers in non-locality into defenders of locality). In
effect, I believe that non-locality is a non-necessary de-
parture from what is needed to make physics work, which
furthermore introduces magical nuances that are contra-
dictory to essential changes over Newtonian physics.
3.3: A short nomenclature of instrumental realism
Definition 2 (Realism and weak realism) In this
paper, realism always means instrumental realism, by
this the following is meant:
(Instrumental) realism holds true for some observable for
some particle if that observable gets a value and in par-
ticular pre-exists measurement on that particle, whenever
that observable is measured on that particle, or the value
of the observable converges to the measured value as one
approaches from below the time of measurement.
(Instrumental) realism holds true in some setting if it
holds true for one at least of the particles that participate
to that setting.
Remark 1 (Realism without measurement) If re-
alism holds true in some setting, I consider that it holds
true as well when the measurement of the pre-existing
measurable is not executed, but the rest of the setting re-
mains the same. In some sense, this tells that future
choices cannot change the present.
Most physicists have come to adopt the point of view
that realism does not work in microphysics. If one thinks
about a particle involved in a two slits experiment, it
seems clear that if one (suddenly) decides to measure the
moment or position of that particle, that observable does
not pre-exist measurement since otherwise one would get
classical trajectories that would be incompatible with the
interference fringes. I will show in this paper (see Claim
1 in Subsection 4.1) that weak realism holds true.
Remark 2 (On Einstein and realism) I want to em-
phasize that the text by Einstein from p. 317 of [31]
7(and reproduced above in subsection 3.2) stays clear from
realism and that factual reality does not mean that ob-
servables have values before being observed, a point that
will be discussed in Remark 15 and again, in the light of
Claim 4, in Remark 17.
It has been solidly established, and often purposely ig-
nored, that the EPR paper [2] has been written by Podol-
sky and was disliked by Einstein who most probably did
not see the final version before it got printed (see in par-
ticular [3], [33], [34], [4]). Einstein’s discussion is quite
different, in particular where it comes to realism, from
the point of view that one finds in the EPR paper [2]. So
I propose a sort of scale of possible attitudes toward real-
ism. The attitudes that I list are not all expressed along
the same point of view. Anyway, the way one should
think about realism in order to deal with microphysics
is not that obvious, assuming even that there is in fact
a single good angle, a simplification that is not clearly
justified as far as I know. The list hereafter expresses
my own views so that for instance “ERP realism” means
“my own view about the ERP realism”: I insist on mak-
ing this quite clear because the subject has tremendously
suffered from unfair attributions of believes and thoughts,
and even from numerous miss-quotations.
- (A) Strong realism: All quantities pre-exist mea-
surement. Mermin’s 3 particle GHZ setting allows one
to show that this is inappropriate for microphysics (see
Lemmas 1 and 2).
- (B) EPR realism: The EPR paper does not state
explicitly a position on the existence of pre-existing value.
We read there (as a definition of element of physical re-
ality [2]:
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can pre-
dict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity)
the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an el-
ement of physical reality corresponding to this physical
quantity.”
I believe that, according to the EPR paper, quantities that
can be predicted for sure pre-exist measurement. At least
this is something that can be read, I think, from Rosen’s
1985 paper [7], but since Einstein seems to not believe
that, it is hard to know what was meant by Podolsky in
[2] (on Podolsky’s aggressive attitude toward QM in 1935
when he wrote [2] see, e.g., [3]).
Definition 3 (Sensitivity to protocol and reallity)
Assume one has an element of reality with properties
associated to measurements A and B. When one says
that measurement A has answer a and measurement B
has answer b, it either mean means that:
- Measurement A has answer a if measurement A is
the one that is made and measurement B has answer b
if measurement B is the one that is made, in which case
one has protocol sensitivity,
or that:
- Measurement A would have answer a and measure-
ment B would have answer b whatever measurement is
made or not, in which case one does not have protocol
sensitivity.
The element of physical reality concept is utilized in the
EPR paper using a counterfactual (see p. 779), which
tells us that the proof of non-completeness of QM in the
EPR paper is not (fully) right (something hard to pin too
hard on Podolsky as explained in Subsection 3.2) but this
does not condemn the concept itself. What is unclear is
whether the “certainty” in EPR’s definition of elements
of reality entails protocol sensitivity, in the sense given by
Definition 3. This issue for historians is not discussed in
the present paper (although I am not sure that historians
have treated elements of reality fairly, so far); instead, I
list possible points of view as follows:
• (B.1) If certainty does not require protocol sensi-
tivity (sensitivity upon the protocol being used to
get certainty), we have what I call simple EPR re-
alism. Mermin’s 3 particle GHZ setting allows one
to show (using Lemmas 1 and 2) that simple EPR
realism is inappropriate for microphysics, at least
if one accepts locality.
• (B.2) If certainty requires protocol sensitivity, we
have what I call protocol sensitive EPR realism:
the question remains open as far as I know as to
whether this holds true in microphysics, or not.
• (B.3) If the simple EPR realism is used only in
non counterfactual ways, so that certain predic-
tions are made on the basis of measurements on
other particles that have been done or on the ba-
sis of a well defined unique measurement that could
have been done (rather than on the basis of any ex-
periment that could be done or of all experiments
that could have been done), we have what I call
counterfactual-sensitive EPR realism: the question
remains open as far as I know as to whether this
holds true in microphysics, or not.
Elements of reality-based realism is usually attached to
the name of Einstein (with an imprecision that has gen-
erated the list (B.1), (B.2), (B.3) just above) although
Einstein did not use it when discussing the EPR setting.
Einstein even expressed that he did not care about the
“value of the observables” issue in a letter written in 1935
to Schro¨dinger (see [4]).
Remark 3 (Rosen’s testimony on EPR and HV)
One is often induced to think EPR called for a very
naive form of HV (the form used by Bell in [8]),
something which has been made highly disputable by a
paper by Rosen [7], written about EPR fifty years after
the publication of the EPR paper. Rosen also defends in
[7] the soundness of the EPR paper if one accepts the
8hypotheses and views on QM expressed in [2], even if he
then backs off from locality, an essential hypothesis of
[2].
- (C) Einstein’s realism: While Einstein’s realism
seem to have varied considerably, and some of his writ-
ings are hard to decrypt because of the allegorical tone,
it is hard to pin more on him that the fact that real states
are well defined anyhow, which is what I will use as defi-
nition of Einstein’s realism (or E-realism) in the present
paper. My opinion is that if any form of EPR realism
had to be isolated as one Einstein would trust, it would
be counterfactual sensitive EPR realism (B.3).
The above excerpt in Subsection 3.2 , where Einstein
gives his own rendition of the EPR issue, provides an ex-
ample of how cautious Einstein was with matters such
as realism and counterfactuals (even if some of the con-
cept were not yet fully crystalized). What was clearly
explained by Rosen, Fine, and others, is that reinter-
preting Einstein’s realism as meaning a belief in Hidden
Variables of the form disqualified in a few lines by Bell
has no foundation. The only thing proven by such a rein-
terpretation is that Bell had a lot of chutzpah.
- (D) OQM-realism attitude: Orthodox QM (see
also Subsection 4.2) accepts that measured quantities
post-exist measurement. One can use here the follow-
ing lines written by Nathan Rosen 50 years after he co-
authored the EPR paper.
“[For Quantum Mechanics] The elements of reality are
only those physical quantities for which the wave func-
tion predicts definite values. In the EPR example, if a
measurement of A results in system II having a wave
function ψk(x2) which is an eigenfunction of P , then P
is an element of reality. If measuring B leads to II having
a wave function φk(x2) which is an eigenfunction of Q,
then Q is an element of reality. Since there is no wave
function of II for which both P and Q have definite val-
ues, they cannot both be elements of reality at the same
time. According to this point of view, the description
of physical reality by wave function is always complete
because reality corresponds to what the wave functions
describe.”
- (E) Weak realism: Weak realism (or W-realism)
accepts, I recall, that measured quantities and quantities
that have been predicted for sure do pre-exist measure-
ment in some but not all cases.
- (F) E-W realism: This is what one gets by com-
bining weak realism with Einstein realism. This reflects
my own position, but it is interesting to see what one can
get from each of the E and the W.
- (G) A-realism: According to A-realsim, measured
quantities do not pre-exist measurement. I hope that
the present paper will show A-realism to be too extreme
a position.
Remark 4 (Jammer, Einstein, and realism) While
Jammer was most probably right to say that Einstein was
the origin of this concept, the precise form of “element
of physical reality” in [2] is different from what Einstein
used in such context, a difference that is pointed out by
Fine in [4] and that can be checked on the few publicly
accessible documents that one has from Einstein on such
matters.
3.4: A few notes on [2] and [17]
The proof of (*) (or attempt of proof?) given in [2] is
very nicely analyzed by Fine in [4] although I may differ
with him on assessing what (if anything) goes wrong with
that proof. Briefly, Podolsky justifies two premises (to
see clearly the structure that I report here following for
instance [4] or [35], just analyze the paper starting from
the end after reading it forward):
- the first one (see [2] p. 778) is that:
• (I-1): either (*) is true, or;
• (I-2): conjugate quantities cannot have simultane-
ous reality.
- the second one (see [2] p. 780) is that:
• (II-1): if (*) is false, then;
• (II-2): conjugate quantities can simultaneously
have (arbitrarily) precise values.
From these premises, which Podolsky tries to establish,
and QM, the statement (*) would follow easily. To prove
these premises, a gedanken experiment setting is pro-
posed (which is of course the EPR setting described in
Subsection 2.1), and Podolsky uses both locality and ele-
ments and reality, both of which have been charged later
by some to be “the problem”. This is because a lot of peo-
ple got convinced (wrongly I believe as will be explained
in Section 5) that Bell’s enriched version of EPRB was
leading to a contradiction as I recall below in Section 5
(while earlier attacks on [2], such as [36] were at best
not conclusive). My view, is that the second premise
of Podolsky is established in [2] using a counterfactual
gedanken experiment (another one, this time in the anal-
ysis of teh main one), which would make the paper wrong.
However, I am not sure of my attack because of the lack
of clarity of the text which has kept other critics as per-
plexed as I am, even when the main issue that they have
is different from mine.
Besides the subtle (but I believe actual) use of coun-
terfactual that I have detected in [2] and that the reader
is invited to discover as well directly from the source,
I report here a clue of another sort that I consider as
very convincing on the question of the counterfactual na-
ture of the argument to prove (*) in [2]. This is the fact
9that in [2], Podolsky points out (in his own terms: the
word counterfactual is never mentioned in [2] and the
concept was even not yet isolated: imagine what Bohr
could have answered in [36] otherwise, especially if Mer-
min and Peres for instance (and if I understand what they
mean) are right on the fact that Bohr has attacked in [36]
the counterfactual character of [2]!) that if counterfactu-
als are not allowed, then his proof of non-completeness
of QM breaks down. More precisely, he writes:
“Indeed, one would not arrive at our conclusion [i.e., (*)]
if one insisted that two or more physical quantities can be
regarded as simultaneous elements of reality only when
they can be simultaneously measured or predicted. On
this point of view, since either one or the other, but not
both simultaneously, of the quantities P and Q can be
predicted, they are not simultaneously real. This makes
the reality of P and Q depend upon the process of mea-
surement carried out on the the first system, which does
not disturb the second system in any way. No reasonable
definition of reality could be expected to permit this.”
Hence Podosky also says (again, in his own terms) that
elements of reality that would need to adapt to coun-
terfactual analysis cannot make sense: he thus missed a
deep difficulty that comes with talking about Quantum
Mechanical phenomena, and created for himself a trap in
which Einstein did not fall in his own further presenta-
tions.
As for the attacks by Bell, I try to dismiss them in
Chapter 5, also on the basis of the use by Bell of coun-
terfactuals, something to which Einstein escaped in his
treatment of the EPR problem has reported above in
Subsection 3.2. I hope to come back on these issues else-
where but I do not want to dive here into too much of
historical digressions.
Bohm tried in his version [17] of EPR, to call the at-
tention on the fact that, when using the singlet state and
measuring spins on axes x and y that are mutually or-
thogonal and orthogonal to the axis of propagation, one
get something that resembles action at a distance since
for any choice of (x, y), and assuming that the first mea-
sure is performed on the electron and along x, one gets
for the positron:
- Minus the electron reading if one performs an x-
reading,
- Equidistribution of the outputs + and - readings if
one performs a y-reading.
It is this discussion (or EPRB as reiterated in [19] in
the framework of photon polarization) that got enriched
in Bell’s work to be reviewed briefly in Chapter 5. I hope
to come back on these issues elsewhere as well but like in
the case of the original EPR above, I want to avoid here
further historical digressions. Besides, I will provide in
[37] a simpler counter-argument to the paradoxical aspect
of EPRB that what I achieve in the present paper as a
byproduct of Claims 1 to 3.
4: CONSERVATION LAWS AND
SCHRO¨DINGER’S UNORTHODOXY THEOREM
4.1: Conservation laws and instrumental realism:
the first main EPR claim
The point of view that conservation laws cannot be
invoked in the EPR setting has become quasi official,
despite the counterfactual character of Bell inequalities,
or rather because that character has been too often over-
looked. Refusing the role of conservation laws in the EPR
setting goes in the same direction as lending to Einstein
naive points of view that are easily shown to be wrong.
The following Claim that helps me defend the opposite
position. It turns out that this claim is essential for most
of what is presented here.
Claim 1 In an EPR-type situation (with a symmetric
pair of particles or not), assume that one performs on
one of the particles the measurement of an observable cor-
responding to a conserved quantity once the particles are
separated. Then the outcome of the measurement and the
conservation law corresponding to the conserved quantity
allow the knowledge of the value on both particles of that
observable. In particular, instrumental realism holds true
in this situation, from which the rest of the claim follows
readily.
Remark 5 (Quasi invariance) As pointed out to me
by Larry Horwitz, all conservation laws need not remain
absolute in QM. For instance, the constraint of the to-
tal spin remaining constant along an axis ( e.g., staying
equal to zero along any axis in the case of the creation of
a pair) may have to be taken with a grain of salt because
of a phase problem when the particles separate, at least in
the non-relativistic case that we consider here. But that
would not affect the discussion as quasi-conservation laws
can be used as well as long as they are effective laws and
the quasi-conservation is absolute and not merely statis-
tical or of probability one. We also implicitly assume that
curvature effects are negligible.
Remark 6 (Two-States and Many Worlds)
Important schools of interpretation of QM, including
Yakir Aharonov, Lev Vaidman and some of their collab-
orators, have developed a view of the world that includes
the Many World Interpretation of QM, which indeed
allows to reduce to nothing many phenomena that appear
as paradoxes in other interpretations of QM. The arsenal
of tools being used include the use of a two-state vectors
formalism, and the points of views taken include:
- α) considering that QM is nonlocal
and:
- β) considering that if two conjugate observables are
measured on a particle m at times t1 and t2 with t2 > t1,
with respective values π1 and κ2, then if no interaction
involving m happens in the open interval (t1, t2), in that
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interval the second observable has the value κ2 (then the
other observable has value π1 but no one would have an
issue with that).
The point of view β is what I would call (systematic)
instrumental realism, according to the nomenclature pro-
posed in subsection 3.3: this clashes with Remark 1 except
if one accepts strong realism as defined in subsection 3.3.
There is an important body of work behind the few lines
of the present remark: l refer to the review paper [38],
and just mention [39] as a relatively early paper where
the instrumental realism in the form of β is explicitly
stated.
Arguments for Claim 1. The use of separation is
trivial, with details left to the reader. By conservation
of the quantity at hand (which is commented upon in
Remark 5), if the initial value of that quantity is v0 and
the measurement on particle 1 gives v1, then the value of
the same observable on particle 2 is v2 = v0 − v1 if the
measure on the second particle is also performed (or at
least approximately so: see Remark 5).
I). Conservation law argument. At any time be-
fore measurement on the second particle, the value of
the same observable on particle 2 is v2 = v0−v1 whether
or not the measurement will eventually be made or not,
since the total value of the observable is conserved (or at
least approximately so: see Remark 5).
II). WPR argument. One is now invited to consider
WPR as a mathematical trick. Anyway, WPR or not,
the packet is reduced after the first measurement (on the
first particle) so that there is a true value to be “read”
on the second particle in case the second measurement is
performed.
III). Secure value prediction argument. I notice
that, if v0 is known (which is often the case with v0 = 0
indeed), the result v2 = v0 − v1 appears as a sure mea-
surement prediction either by using the conservation law,
or by using WPR which makes v2 appear as an eigenvalue
for the operator corresponding to a measurement of the
observable on the second particle (as described in fact in
[2]). This secure prediction of the value can be considered
as extension of the definition of the value: experimental
verifications could be made if the position and momen-
tum could be observed since measuring ~p1 and inducing
the other moment ~p2, after measuring the position ~q2 and
taking the pair (~p2, ~q2) as an arbitrarily good approxima-
tion close enough to where ~q2 is measured (see also Claim
2 and the arguments for it), one could compute trajecto-
ries for the two particles.
Remark 7 (About [28] and GHZ) In [28] one can
find what seems to be a direct contradiction to the Se-
cure value prediction argument. However, the authors
consider a case with no measurement made in the con-
text of GHZ. When one of the observers considers that
an outcome is sure, it is in fact sure if some correspond-
ing measurements and not other ones are performed by
the two other observers. With no counterfactual, there is
no problem in the GHZ situation. If an observer knows
the result of his or her observation, and the protocols to
be used by the two others, the product of the values to
be read by the two others is known for sure. Similarly,
if two observers have made their observations and can
communicate, then if they know the protocol to be used
by the last observer, they can predict surely the outcome
of the third measurement. The two last statements can be
reformulated to cover the case when one observer, or two
observers who can communicate, consider what can be
deduced from the different possible outcomes of the mea-
surements that each of them could perform.
Notice that as long as the prediction of values is made
on the basis of other measurements that have been done
rather than on the basis of other measurements that could
be done, the Mermin GHZ setting does not any more pro-
vide a counter-example to the “Secure value prediction
argument”. In fact, neither the protocol sensitive EPR
realism (B.2) nor the counterfactual-sensitive EPR real-
ism (B.3) are faulted by the Mermin GHZ setting as a
careful examination confirms.
The Conservation law and the Secure value prediction
arguments could be disputed by some as being manifesta-
tions of realism as usual. This would be wrong, however
I next provide an alternate argument based on the inter-
pretation of some “one pair at a time” experiments.
IV). Experiments interpretation argument. In
order to argue on the basis of experiments, I will need
to involve the more quantitative Claims 2 and 3 that
are shown later to be easy consequences of Claim 1, and
even possibly some further tests discussed in Remark 12
in the case of momentum and position. This is perfectly
fine as the goal is to get a coherent theory for the phys-
ical world, and not at all to build an axiomatic theory
(the hope of catching the description of the world into an
axiomatic theory is still amazingly strong, but is proba-
bly an anthropocentrism awaiting its Copernician Revo-
lution; I rather think that it is mostly the fossilized pieces
of science that admit a full mathematical description).
In experiments like [40] and [41], one uses one element
of an EPR pair to perform a double slit experiment or
another comparable experiment. Performing a position
(or vector momentum) measurement on the other parti-
cle (say the second particle) allows us to know enough of
the trajectory of the first particle to determine which slit
would be used. This explains that as an experimental fact
there are no interferences in one particle at a time double-
slit experiments performed with one of the members of an
EPR pair. The same suppression of interferences on the
first particle arises even if no measurement is performed
on the second particle. Hence, as a sign of locality by
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itself, performing or not the measurement on the second
particle of an EPR pair does not change anything to the
fact that the path of the first particle is predictable and
does not produce interference fringes. I interpret this sup-
pression of interference fringes as the fact that the EPR
type entanglement selects the particle nature of the ele-
ments of a pair, just as measurements (which formally are
like entanglements), often select one or the other of the
particle or wave characters. The measurement-like char-
acter of entanglements is a well known aspect already
mentioned as far back as [1]. Once trajectories make
sense, a small act of faith seems to be needed to accept
that the momentum preexists measurement, as well as
position (where position values approach measured val-
ues along the trajectories):
- Either we will need to build on the consequences of
Claim 1 as expressed in Claim 2 to get to means, in the
form of Remark 12, to experimentally support the fact
that indeed realism holds true for the momentum and
for the position of the two particles in the EPR context.
More precisely Claims 1 to 2 together with the exper-
iments that we have so far and with the experimental
tests that can be built following Remark 12 are expected
to form a coherent combination of theory and data.
- Or we admit that the only impediment to classical
coordinate is the lack of trajectories, so that (de facto)
experimental evidence for trajectories is (de jure) exper-
imental evidence for position and momentum.
A gap needs to be bridged when extending the validity
of instrumental realism to observables that are not in-
volved in the real trajectory-like behavior in double slit
and similar experiments. However, in the case of the po-
larization of photon (formally similar to the spin of spin-
1
2 particles), one can invoke the experiments that were
performed a priori to verify that QM does not satisfy
the Bell inequalities. These experiments (see, e.g., [20],
[21]) do certainly not achieve what is claimed that they
do because of the counterfactual nature of Bell type in-
equalities. However they do offer further verifications of
QM and in particular of the Malus Law up to the sign (so
much that we will not need the counterpart of Remark
12 in the spin case).
Remark 8 (Malus Law) I briefly review Malus Law
for spin- 12 particles measured along two successive Stern-
Gerlach magnets respectively along ~a and~b, that both gen-
erate +1 for a positive spin, -1 for a negative spin along
their respective vectors. Malus Law reads
Q(~a,~b) = ~a ·~b , (9)
when expressed in terms of the average of the product
of the successive spins along ~a and ~b. One also often
uses S(~a,~b), the probability of having the same read-
ing, which is related to the other quantity by Q(~a,~b) =
2S(~a,~b) − 1. With θ standing for the angle between ~a
and ~b, some readers are probably more familiar with the
formula
S(~a,~b) = cos2(θ
2
) , (10)
and use Equation 10 as the expression of the Malus Law
rather than Equation 9 which can be rewritten as
Q(~a,~b) = 2 cos2(θ
2
)− 1 = cos(θ) .
Coming back to the experiments (supposedly) related
to Bell’s inequality (a matter that will be discussed fur-
ther in Section 5), one uses there Stern-Gerlash magnets
respectively along ~a and ~b, respectively for the two parti-
cles of an EPR pair (in fact, one uses polarizers since the
experiments are performed with EPR photons, but the
algebra is identical). The sign for the average of prod-
ucts P(~a,~b) of spins from a pair (or of polarizations of
photons from a pair) gets reversed with respect to the
Malus Law, so that QM predicts (see Section 5):
P(~a,~b) = −~a ·~b (11)
Thus, by confirming Equation 11, the experiments aimed
at supporting verifying that Nature follows QM rather
than very naive Bell-type inequalities fail their goals
(doubly as neither QM nor nature accepts the counter-
factual needed in Bell-type inequalities) but provide a
strong confirmation of instrumental realism. More pre-
cisely this confirmation:
- Is obtained directly for the polarization of photons,
in view of the analysis made in the arguments for Claim
3 below, so that Claims 1 to 3 together with the experi-
ments done so far form a coherent combination of theory
and data.
- Requires some good faith to be extended to the spin
of spin- 12 particles, given that the algebras for the spin of
spin- 12 particles and for the polarization of photons are
alike while no experimental data are available in the case
of the spin of spin- 12 particles.
Summarizing now what we have learned about several
observables:
- Experiments of the [40] or [41] type (contribute to)
provide evidence of the fact that instrumental realism
works on the second particle, hence on the first particle as
well by symmetry of labeling for momentum and position.
- Experiments aimed at checking the status of Nature
as compared with what is told by the Bell inequality as
in [20], [21] cover the case of the polarization for photons,
from which I feel comfortable for the case of the spin of
spin- 12 particles as well.
One might consider that there is then no good reason
to not believe that instrumental realism also works for
other observables. Anyway, we have more than enough
to allow us later to prove Claim 2.
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The instrumental realism is the hard part of Claim 1:
the rest follows easily since we know what happens when
measurements are made on the two particles. This fin-
ishes the arguments to establish Claim 1.
Remark 9 (Entanglement and measurement)
The rationale for instrumental realism to work in all
cases is that entangled particles in EPR pairs sort of
“measure each other”. It seems reasonable to consider
the wave-particle dualism as the main cause of non-
realism in general, and EPR entanglement as a dualism
breaker. The formal identity of EPR entanglement and
measurement goes as far back at least as 1935 [1].
It so happens that the term eraser is used in the con-
text of the experiments that I consider here, but to de-
scribe another effect than the suppression of interferences
that I have invoked in my argument: the interference
fringes are restored and then erased (again, so to speak)
by further manipulations. Eraser experiments show that
entanglements are really two particle states, and that dis-
carding this fact prevents one from understanding some
of the phenomenology. This does not contradict the fact
that, whenever the two particles are far apart, some ob-
servables can make sense for each of them, which is all
that is needed in order to justify the point of view that
I defend. In fact, all my arguments hinge in some way
on the very special character of entangled states of the
EPR type, as did Einstein’s argument and the argument
presented by Podolsky in [2].
Remark 10 (Is weak realism new?) The very con-
cept of weak realism (instrumental realism special to some
settings, such as EPR entanglements I recall) might be
new in explicit form. However, it seems obvious that
the EPR authors and Schro¨dinger at least felt that some-
thing like this was true since 1935, 69 years before the
present work began. Measurement and new developments
in Quantum Computing make entanglements a rather
pervasive phenomenon, as Schro¨dinger already noticed
in [1]. This does not mean that instrumental realism is
prevalent since the GHZ setting clearly shows that some
entanglements do not generate pre-existence to experi-
ments of observable values.
4.2: Measuring on both EPR particles: the second
main EPR claim
Claim 2 In an EPR-type situation, one can access with
arbitrary precision the values of both members of a pair
of conjugate observables on at least one of the elements of
the pair of particles if instrumental realism holds true for
both observables. Assuming that the measurements on the
two particles are space-like separated, this access to in-
formation takes place after the second observable is mea-
sured on the second particle. The information so obtained
on values of a pair of conjugate observables is about the
second particle. This information is valid before that sec-
ond measurement on the second particle but after the first
measurement has been performed on the first particle.
This claim is not new in essence but this explicit form
is both weaker and broader than the original result by
Schro¨dinger in [1] (see [3], [5]). What seems also to
be new is the non-trivial time shift about when double
knowledge is valid and when it is made available. See also
the series of papers [18] where Schro¨dinger furthermore
introduces the celebrated Paradox of the cat which grew
out of correspondence with Einstein (see [4] for a critical
review of this correspondence).
I pause here to formulate a definition that will help map
the result of Schro¨dinger in [1] and [18] to some of the
preoccupations of Einstein.
Definition 4 - (i) Orthodox Quantum Mechanics, as I
define it, postulates simultaneous inaccessibility to con-
jugate observable, even by means not previously thought
about, so that the Hilbert spaces and Hermitian operators
acting on them are perfectly matched by the theory that
describes the physical world.
- (ii) Orthodox Quantum Mechanics also rejects the
validity of (*). This rejection is exactly Einstein’s own
characterization of Orthodox Quantum Mechanics: on p.
681 of [6], he writes:
“ “orthodox” refers to the thesis that the ψ-function
characterizes the individual system exhaustively.”
I have extended Einstein’s definition because of what
I feel is more basic for modern QM, while Bell’s argu-
ments for non-locality revolve around the negation of (*).
In what follows, Orthodox means either (i), (ii), or both,
depending on the context. For instance I will establish
the violation (i) below in this subsection as a way to cor-
rect Podolsky’s argument in [2]: the violation of (ii) then
follows. See also below, Remark 13.
Schro¨dinger reaches in [1] the conclusion that there can
be too many observables values per particle in the EPR
configuration by measuring say, the position ~q1 on parti-
cle 1 and the momentum ~p2 on particle 2, and inferring
from that the position ~q2 of particle 2 and the momentum
~p1 of particle 1. From there he gets into issues of com-
paring values of functions of observable with functions of
values of observables, which arguably lead to potential
difficulties (see [1] and [5]). The key remark behind that,
indeed one of the well known EPR facts, is that ~q1 − ~q2
and ~p1 + ~p2 commute. I come back to the algebra after
the following remark.
Remark 11 (Asking for less) Also well known, but
not taken into account by Schro¨dinger, is the remark that
the origin, the place where the particles are starting from,
is not (precisely known). Because of that the Uncertainty
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Relation would take its toll right there if need was of de-
termining one of ~q2 and ~q1 from measuring the other one.
In fact, instead of ~q2+~q1 = ~0, we have ~q2+~q1 = ~U , where
~U stands for some unknown vector. In what follows, I
just try to get the values of both observables on one of
the particles, except if a second conservation law allows
for more, as it is the case with spins in the EPRB configu-
ration. Thus there appears to be a flaw in Schro¨dinger’s
approach, but that flaw gets corrected in the argument
that I provide below to establish Claim 2, mostly by ask-
ing for less and changing:
- The time when the simultaneous values of two conju-
gate observable on one particle makes sense,
and
- The time when such knowledge becomes accessible.
The EPRB configuration is the framework of the short
paper [42] where Peres focuses on the algebraic play be-
tween values of functions of observable and functions of
values of observables. Without any mention to [1] nor
[18], Peres is trying in [42] to get even stronger contradic-
tions than in [2] out of the use of the concept of element
of reality (see also p. 151 in his book [22]). The goal
of[42] is (as I understand it) to get stronger arguments
than before against what, like others, he presents as “the
local realism of Einstein” (see Subsection 3.3 above and
references therein for alternates views on that). Peres
takes seriously enough the algebraic contradictions that
he can reach to claim derailing, at least implicitly, the
EPR attempt at questioning QM by raising the issue (*).
However, he uses a lot of counterfactuals in [42] (and in
[22]) to reach a contradiction (see also the analysis of
Peres’ argument in [5]). Thus the contradiction reached
by Peres, under the assumption that one gets values of
two conjugate spin observables on the two particles of
the EPRB pair, is moot and does not compromise the
validity of arguments to establish Claim 2, and even less
the validity of Claim 2 itself. Notice that formulas for
products of spins, one of which is obtained by instrumen-
tal realism, have no reason to be related to products of
spins actually measured consecutively on the same par-
ticle, which are the products that one finds in most text-
books on QM. In brief, the anti-realist conclusions that
are reached in Peres’ paper are comparable to, and can
be argued against as, the conclusion of Mermin’s version
of the GHZ entanglement (a version of which appears on
pp. 152-153 of [22]).
Remark 12 (Beyond academic value) Getting the
values of two projections of a spin of a particle before that
particle gets measured for one of the projection may seem
to be a candidate for one more “so what?” among the
QM-related claims that have no experimentally verifiable
content. However, in the (~p, ~q) case, in the academic
case when ~q1+ ~q2 is known, one would be able to compute
actual trajectories by using (say) ~p2 = − ~p1 and the
measured value of ~q2 as an arbitrary good approximation
of ~q2 just before that measurement. In fact, one can
also do that in the actual, non-academic case when the
value of the conserved quantity ~q1 + ~q2 = ~U remains
unknown, but then, to the contrary of the academic case,
one cannot then describe as well the trajectory of the
first particle.
Arguments for Claim 2.
- α) Notice first that Claim 2 is plain in the case of
the (energy, time) pair or (E, t). This case seems to not
need entanglements, and this would be the case if one
could find a process that generates particles with known
fixed energies. This is only one aspect of the fact that
the status of the (E, t) pair. Time measurement does
not correspond to a Hermitian operator and the status
of this pair with respect to the Uncertainty Principle is
special as commented upon already in [44]. In fact (see
[43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [22] (pp. 413-415), [48] and
references therein):
- If the Hamiltonian H is not known, then a measure-
ment necessarily takes a minimum time t which obeys an
uncertainty relation of the form ∆t ·∆E ≥ A, where A is
a number that depends on the Hamiltonian H and where
∆Eis the precision of the energy measurement.
- If the Hamiltonian H is known then it is claimed in
[48] (see also [45], [47]) that we can measure the energy
as precisely as we want in a time as short as we want.
However (as noticed in [46]), in order to refute the (E, t)
uncertainty relation Aharonov and Bohm introduce into
the Hamiltonian in [45], an interaction term involving
a discontinuous function of time. This procedure im-
plies that instantaneous energy changes of a predictable
amount and at a given instant can be observed, which is
itself in violation of the uncertainty relation. Aharonov
and Bohm’s 1961 argument thus contains a petitio prin-
cipii, which is corrected in [47] by letting the discontinu-
ity happen in space. Peres defends in [22] (pp. 413-415)
that QM is a construct like Euclidean geometry (for in-
stance) and should be judged internally as such, so that
the possibility to realize a given setting as in [47] is of
practical and not of fundamental importance. This view
clearly clashes with the one that I defend here, that QM
is a physics theory that has suffered from premature (and
quasi-religious) transformation into an axiomatic theory.
Peres also mention (on p. 415 of his book) the other Un-
certainty Relations exclusively in their dispersion mean-
ing, but to my opinion, this is providing a quite interest-
ing but very partial view on a multi-faceted phenomenon.
Hence, since such matters will not have too much conse-
quences on points β), γ), and δ), and given the motiva-
tions that I have which need only one instance where the
axiomatic formalism of QM would be chattered, I stop
short here on the discussion of point α). I leave to the
reader to decide if the case can be made with the (E, t)
pair and turn my attention to other pairs of conjugate
observables.
14
- β) For the (momentum, position) pair or (~p, ~q), we
have seen in Remark 11 that in general, the vector ~q1+ ~q2
is conserved to an unknown value, say ~U not necessarily
equal to ~0 . This does not prevent however the argu-
ments for Claim 1 to work as well as when ~U = ~0. Thus
instrumental realism holds true for the positions ~q1 and
~q2, and we can take the measured value of ~q2 as an arbi-
trarily good approximation of what is ~q2 just before the
measurement takes place at time t2 on particle 2. Fur-
thermore, using Claim 1, I also get ~p2 as − ~p1, where ~p1
has been measured on particle 1 at time t1, before (in
any frame, because of the space-like separation hypothe-
sis) measuring on particle 2. So after t1 and just before
t2, I get p2 and almost q2 (with arbitrarily good approxi-
mation) on particle 2. This is less than what Schro¨dinger
got in [1], which might be an advantage, as pointed out
in Remark 11.
- γ) Still for (~p, ~q) the claim can also be applied to the
(academic) case when ~q1 + ~q2 is conserved to a known
value. In that case, one falls in the general case of two
conserved quantities with known initial values (the as-
sociated difficulties, like those that Schro¨dinger got in
[1], have already been commented upon: see for instance
Remark 11).
- δ) We now get to the general case of two conserved
quantities with known initial values, that form a pair
of conjugated observables, such as for instance the spin
projections along two orthogonal axes, say x and z. On
an horizontal axis y = (−∞, ”near” O] ∪ [”near” O,∞)
that represents approximately the two trajectories joined
at or ”near” O (O is known approximately, with some
reasonable bounds: for instance one knows where is the
macroscopic apparatus producing the pairs), let us mark
two further points (possibly up to some small mistake):
- L to the left of O (far enough),
- R to the right of O (far enough).
For definiteness, the electron e is going to the left and
the positron p is going to the right. Measurements will
be made on e at (or near) L, and on p at (or near) R.
Notice that any conserved quantity remains unchanged
on (”near” L, ”near” O) and on (”near” O, ”near” R,
with possible sign reversal at (or near) crossing O (for
such matters related to conservation laws, see however
Remark 5).
However, inferring this fact (then in view of time in-
variance) may appear to be a realistic view that should
be subject to question if not rejected right away if
the conservation on (”near” L, ”near” O) (respectively
(”near” O, ”near” R)) is inferred to claim that the mea-
sured value at or near L (respectively at or near R)
is meaningful as well on (”near” L, ”near” O) (respec-
tively (”near” O, ”near” R)). However, for conserved
quantities, one can invoke the corresponding conservation
law and Claim 1 to infer the conservation of the value of
the observable - up to sign - on (”near” L, ”near” O)
(respectively (”near” O, ”near” R)) from the measured
value at or near R (respectively at or near L). Then one
can invoke again Claim 1 and the very same correspond-
ing conservation law to infer, up to sign, the value of the
observable on the other of the (”near” L, ”near” O) or
(”near” O, ”near” R) segments than the one that has
been used so far.
This being said, I will always rely on this discus-
sion when I allow myself to skip writing it and say
globally that any conserved quantity remains unchanged
on (”near” L, ”near” O) and on (”near” O, ”near” R),
with possible sign reversal at (or near) crossing O.
The fact that e looks like “minus the parti-
cle p after the measurement has been made on
(”near” L, ”near” O)” rather than (in fact as well as)
“minus the particle p before the measurement has been
made on (”near” L, ”near” O)” is linked to the special
entanglement structure which makes some special con-
clusions of the realist point of view work fine (see Claim
1).
I present only the case of the spin for clarity, with no
serious loss of generality. Thus assuming that the direc-
tion x is used for measuring e at (or near) L yielding
Q1 = sx(e), and that the direction z is used for measur-
ing p at (or near) R yielding Q2 = sz(p), one notices
that ( with multiple use of Claim 1):
• Q1 is conserved on [”near” L, ”near” O], so
that Q˜1 = sx(p) = −Q1 is conserved on
[”near” O, ”near” R].
• Q2 is conserved on [”near” O, ”near” R], so
that Q˜2 = sz(e) = −Q2 is conserved on
[”near” L, ”near” O].
Thus in the case of conjugate variables, measuring
on both e and p allows simultaneous knowledge of this
pair of conjugate observables on the open intervals be-
fore measurement and far enough from O on both sides,
which ends the arguments for Claim 2.
4.3: Some more comments on Claim 2
As pointed out to me by Marco Martens when I told
him about Claim 2, the possibility to measure, one on
each side, observables that are conjugate becomes plain
when one realizes how obvious it is that these measure-
ments commute. This commutation property is equiva-
lent to Claim 2 once given Claim 1: indeed this yields
another (shorter) proof of Claim 2, using again Claim 1.
The main advantages of the proof that I have chosen are:
- the fact that it distinguishes the case of two conserved
quantities, so that the proof proves more than what is
stated.
- the fact that this proof adapts well for the needs of
Claim 3, which was the original motivation for Claim 2.
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However, as far as the statement chosen for Claim 2 is
the sole concern, the commutation property-rule-based
proof is perhaps the best one, and it reduces the realism
issue to simply using Claim 1 and choosing a good time
to get the values of the two observables.
Remark 13 (The dent in Orthodox QM) Remark
10 has begun discussing the dent in Orthodox QM made
by Claims 1 and 2. By Claim 2 joint inaccessibility to
conjugate variable appears as generic (instead of gen-
eral). However, joint inaccessibility is put, I think, on a
less magical footing by Claim 2 than by axiomatic views,
either Orthodox or Consistent (see [12], [11]). Thus
the reason for joint inaccessibility now appearsto be the
Uncertainty Principle as formulated for measurements
effectively made, ( e.g., on simple isolated systems).
5: TWO ASPECTS OF BELL’S 1964 PAPER
5.1: The two aspects of Bell’s 1964 paper
Except for the Introduction, which has too often es-
caped comments (see however [3]) and that I will discuss
elsewhere (but see also Remark 14), I will mainly break
down the content of Bell’s historical 1964 paper [8] in two
parts:
Part 1 where Bell:
- Introduces the idea of using an arbitrary angle θ be-
tween two Stern-Gerlach vectors ~a and~b that respectively
define se = +1 for the electron and sp = +1 for the
positron,
and then
- Reports that Quantum Mechanics predicts −~a · ~b for
the average P(~a,~b) of se(i) · sp(i) when the pair of
Stern-Gerlach vectors (~a,~b) along which measurements
are made is is chosen, with i standing for the ith pair
(e, p) in the singlet state that is being tested (see Re-
mark 8 and the few line thereafter).
Part 2 where:
Bell first makes us believe that for a local and predic-
tive Hidden Variables theory with the same statistics as
Quantum Mechanics, the average P (~a,~b) of the product
of the spin of e along ~a by the spin of p along ~b would
be the quantity:
P (~a,~b) =
∫
[se(~a, λ) · sp(~b, λ)] ρ(λ) dλ ,
with λ standing for the (possibly multidimensional) hid-
den parameter assumed to have an integrable density and
ρ(λ) the normalized density. From that formula and the
explicit and implicit hypotheses leading to it, Bell easily
deduces:
1 + P (~b,~c) ≥ |P (~a,~b)− P (~a,~c)| (∗∗) .
In fact, in view of se(~b, λ) = −sp(~b, λ) and noticing that
se(~b, λ ∈ {−1, +1}, it is enough to remark that:
P (~a,~b)− P (~a,~c) =
∫
se(~a, λ) · se(~b, λ)[se(~b, λ) · se(~c, λ)− 1] ρ(λ) dλ .
Since, under the stated hypothesis, the identity
P(~f,~g) ≡ P (~f,~g)
follows (or so it seems if one’s attention blinks as will be
detailed), one can easily check that the Bell inequality
(∗∗) seems to be incompatible for some triples (~a,~b,~c)
with the value P(~a,~b) = −~a ·~b predicted by QM. Thus
(failing to notice, or anyway ignoring the counterfactuals
that are implicit in the process of deriving the inequality
and comparing it to QM), Bell concludes:
“In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum
mechanics to determine the results of individual measure-
ments, without changing the statistical predictions, there
must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measur-
ing device can influence the reading of another instru-
ment, however remote.”
For more general inequalities that also now belong to the
family of Bell’s inequalities, see, e.g., [49]. For a lucid
critique see [29] (or p. 312 of [3] for a nice abstract of that
paper). See also Fine’s book [4] and references therein
for related matters.
Remark 14 (What can we learn from [8]?) The
first sentence of Bell’s paper [8] reads:
“The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [2] was
advanced as an argument that quantum mechanics could
not be a complete theory but should be supplemented by
additional variables.”
The second sentence of [8] is not much less irritating. It
reads:
“These additional variables were to restore to the the-
ory causality and locality.”
The fact that [2] is only 4 pages long makes any such mis-
quotation quite painful. Moreover, since the HV provide
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(by the hypothesis in [8]) the same statistics as QM, if
QM is non-local, the HV theory is also non-local: no need
for an inequality. Now if QM is local, the motivation for
[8] is quite questionable from the very point of view of
the second statement in the introduction of [8]: why try
HV to restore locality to a local theory? But since the
inequalities are fully counterfactual, there is not much to
extract from the analysis leading to the inequalities any-
way, and of course as with any counterfactual, there is
no way to experiment whatsoever (see also [13] where the
counterfactual nature of the core of the problem becomes
evident). So the celebrated 1964 paper by Bell [8] appears
as reducing to no physics at all or barely any. Much more
will need to be told elsewhere, hopefully including a long
overdue analysis of attacks by Bell on Jammer in [50].
Meanwhile I salute the provocative effect of [8], even if
that small paper has caused so much confusion.
5.2: On the first part of Bell’s 1964 paper
Part 1 of [8] has seldom been commented upon, with
the noticeable exception of a paper [51] by Louis de
Broglie who refused to believe that P(~a,~b) = −~a ·~b can
occur “for macroscopic separations”, the same words that
Bell used in [52] where he made fun of de Broglie. The
truth is that the old master was wrong in his conclu-
sions, but rightfully felt that something deserved atten-
tion there. What is implied by P(~a,~b) = −~a ·~b is indeed
quite choking. Of course, QM does tell us exactly that
P(~a,~b) = −~a ·~b, by combining WPR and the same con-
siderations that lead to Malus Law for spin- 12 . But the
same Malus Law would, up to sign, give us the same
correlation if a second Stern-Gerlach magnet was placed
at the same angle, after the first magnet on the electron
side. When the particles separate, they are mirror images
of each other: all of a sudden, as the electron passes its
first Stern-Gerlach magnet along ~a, particle p which was
mirror image of e before the magnet, starts to behave as
if it would be the mirror image of the electron after the
magnet.
- On the one hand, one is tempted to say that this is
such an obvious non-locality of QM that one should not
wander that HV theories that imitate QM would also be
non-local: see also Remark 14. Bell also used more triv-
ial settings than EPR to show the non-locality of QM,
an example being, e.g., the analysis that he provided on
p. 89 of [53]. In that example (a single radioactive atom
with detectors of α particles all around: if one detector
detects, the probability for the others to detect immedi-
ately falls to zero) the need for non-locality vanishes if,
following EPR, we agree with (*), to the contrary of the
belief that has entrapped Bell (and others in Quantum
Physics: Bell wrote that he considered that most physi-
cist do not take seriously enough that wave functions is
all there is).
- On the other hand, I will provide evidence for the
fact that all the phenomenology of EPRB, even in the
Bell form, can be explained by recourse to conservation
laws and to the Malus Law so that no appeal to any form
of non-locality is necessary.
5.3: On the second part of Bell’s 1964 paper
The stress of Bell’s historical paper [8] and the fame of
the subject rest on the inequality in Part 2, even if the in-
equality only deals with HV. The “only” here is because
the HV approach was already long abandoned at the time
of EPR, 27 years before [8]. This long abandon is true for
physicists, i.e., in particular not counting von Neumann,
or rather counting him only as a Mathematician (despite
his lasting contributions to physics): von Neumann gave
a false proof of no HV in his historical book [54] in 1932,
thus about three years before [2]. However Einstein and
most other leaders of Physics had abandoned HV since
1927 or 1928 at least (about Einstein and HV, see [4], [3],
and [7]). The hole in the 1932 proof by von Neumann was
pointed out by Bell [55] in a paper published after [8] but
apparently written before (see [3]). As Bell remarks in
[55], the proof by von Neuman was in fact moot by the
time of [55], because of the formulations in 1927 by de
Broglie and in 1952 by Bohm of their respective HV the-
ories. These theories are very similar to each other: for a
full account by de Broglie on his 1927 HV approach, see
his book published much later [56], and for Bohm’s work
on HV see [57]. The motivation of Bell (as he described
it himself) in reviving HV was among other things to de-
fend the de Broglie - Bohm HV theory as a pedagogical
way into QM (at least). The exact technical statement
of the result in [8] was honestly characterized by Bell in
that same paper as a result about HV, even if that was
missed by many. More precisely, Bell’s description of his
own result is honest but wrong. By the time when [8] was
published (29 years after EPR), counterfactual analysis
was not yet at hand (although Einstein and others knew
how to avoid them, in particular when they involved mul-
tiple measurements) and Bell missed the counterfactual
character of the violation of his inequality (and later of
generalizations thereof) by QM and by Nature, as de-
scribed in [29].
6: BELL’S EPR BY COMBINING
CONSERVATION LAWS AND MALUS LAW
6.1: The third main EPR claim
We are left with the formula P(~a,~b) = −~a ·~b predicted
by QM for the arbitrary angle (or Bell configuration)
of EPRB. As long as we had ~b = ±~a, all was fine (if we
forget EPR’s concerns about completeness), in that sense
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that conservation laws could be invoked instead of the
mysterious WPR and we had Claim 1. The goal of the
present section is to show that reduction to conservation
laws is quite general by dealing with the wildest case,
which is provided by Bell’s version of EPRB.
Claim 3 In the EPRB setting with measurements along
vectors ~a for one particle and ~b for the other one, such
that the angle θ from ~a to ~b is known but arbitrary,
the fact that the correlation between the measurements,
P(~a,~b), satisfies P(~a,~b) = − cos(θ) is the result of com-
bining Malus Law with the conservation on angular mo-
mentum projected on any fixed axis.
Arguments for Claim 3. Now I make the measure-
ment on e say, along ~a and the measure on p along ~b.
Reasoning as in the arguments for Claim 2, and in par-
ticular using the instrumental realism from Claim 1, I
get minus the measure on p along ~b on (about) LO for
e, and minus the measure on e along ~a on (about) OR
for p. Applying Malus Law on either side then yields the
desired result. In view of the arguments for Claim 2, this
concludes the arguments for Claim 3
6.2: Back to weak realism
Remark 15 (Weak realism revisited) After all the
discussions that has been offered on instrumental real-
ism, and having gone through the generality of the setting
of Bell’s version of EPRB, I feel it useful to review the
meaning of weak realism. To be specific I will consider
here the case of the spin of p, but other observables would
be amenable to parallel discussions.
If ~c is any vector along which I want to test the posi-
tivity of the spin of e, minus the spin of e will be the spin
of p before I read it by the experiment if I am in a case
when realism holds true. If p is just any particle, I can
choose any one such ~c to extract this knowledge, and that
may be the extent of knowledge that I get. With realsim,
this knowledge corresponds to p from before the measure-
ment and for the future as long as no event happens to
p in any of the directions of time. With no realism, only
the future knowledge is accessible but for (at least most)
practical purposes, this is the only direction of time that
matters.
If now p is one member of an EPR entanglement:
- I know that I have realism in the form of instrumental
realism,
- I can choose two directions along which the value of the
spin of p can be extracted,
- The reading from the direction chosen to measure the
spin of e being taken at t0 (Lorentz invariantly) before
measuring the spin of p along some vector at time t1,
the values of the spins of p along all vectors may make
sense (and for coherence I think, has to make sense) at
t′1 just before t1 (but Lorentz invariantly after t0), but,
- The only values that I can extract at t′1 are those along
the two vectors chosen at t0 for e and at t1 for p, and
this knowledge of what holds true at t′1 will be obtained
not earlier than t1 in the referential where the second
measure is performed.
- From t1 on, the knowledge of only one of the future
spins of p will be accessible: the spin along the vector
chosen to measure the spin of p at t1 since,
- As usual, any other one is eradicated by the measure-
ment process, the same process that forces double knowl-
edge to be only possible in (t0, t1).
7: ON THE DECAY OF GEOMETRY AT SMALL
ENOUGH SCALE
The simple classification of counterfactuals ideas pre-
sented in Section 2 have allowed me to recast in the
“suspicion against counterfactuals mode” some observa-
tions that are rather simple but have far reaching conse-
quences, as I try to expose next.
7.1: Scale-based counterfactuals
As explained in layman terms by Einstein in [58],
length and time measurement tools are essential foun-
dations to mechanics, a profound statement, despite the
fact that it can be very plainly stated. This leads me to
propose the following :
Fundamental observation. There is no mechanics,
without description and measurement of trajectories, so
that, as soon as the atomic nature of the world is ac-
cepted, very small length measure tools and clocks just
do not exist, depriving space, time, and causality (and
other concepts beside those like motion that depend on
these three ones) of any physical sense at a small enough
scale. Furthermore, while the size of small-enough is ill-
defined, and probably not universal anyhow, one can ex-
pect that this is much bigger than the Plank scale.
I have been obsessed by the non-feasibility of tiny
clocks since I was fourteen, but could never use that re-
mark by itself. It is while reading Einstein again, and
getting caught by his emphasis on the need for measure
instruments to build mechanics, that I realized (without
having yet recognized myself the danger of counterfactu-
als that were already well known to many others) that
it was a counterfactual to try measuring space-time at
small enough scale, small enough for no measurement
to be fundamentally doable according to all one knows
of Physics. The consequence as expressed by the above
simple but fundamental observation is then clear. This
implies the following:
Claim 4 Geometry does not have any physical sense at
small enough scale.
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This claim admits in turn the following immediate corol-
lary:
Corollary 1 Causality does not make any physical sense
at such scales.
Remark 16 (A Copenhagen Interpretation view)
Notice that thanks to the basic point of view presented
in Claim 4, the need for Classical Mechanics to even
formulate Quantum Mechanics turns from mysterious
and annoying to rather natural: it plausibly becomes a
need for any Physics of the very small.
Remark 17 (Realism and Pauli’s angels) Realism
takes a new meaning in view of Claim 4: the “coor-
dinates” that make sense for the microscopic world,
or rather what replace coordinates, are different from
the way we express observables by measurements made
by us as macroscopic entities utilizing (macroscopic)
instruments to access information about the microscopic
world. The fact that two conjugate quantities cannot
coexist in general does not imply the doom of realism. It
“only” means that something is lost in the measurement
process, so that realism cannot happen on conjugate
variables on a given particle, except, I claim with
Schro¨dinger (see my Claim 2) for special cases like
particles that participate to EPR type entanglements. In
general, realism may well always be true “for the angels”
(borrowing there the angels from Pauli’s letters to Born
reprinted in [59] about Born dispute with Einstein) with
no mean that I know of to check if it holds or not. Does
this have anything to do with Einstein’s call to get out of
the usual coordinates in order to go beyond QM? Who
might know?
A question that remains is whether there is some un-
derstandable structure, such as topology or combina-
torics, that makes physical sense at arbitrary small scale.
For instance does any structure make sense “in any neigh-
borhood of any point” if topology makes sense, given that
according to Claim 4, there is no more physically mean-
ingful size at such scale? Being able to give a physical
sense to the words “in any neighborhood of any point”
would be a crucial test. One should also take care that
once there are no more scales, “small” and “big” can-
not any more be that different from each other. Indirect
measures such as using mass to infer sizes may be quite
deceptive. When one gets to large enough scales, as mea-
sured from our scale, the relative sizes of where geometry
decays becomes negligible, so that geometry becomes ap-
proximately valid. At intermediate scales, before geom-
etry makes approximate sense, weaker structures such
as topology and order structure may well get physical
meaning. All these things deserve serious investigation.
Because of the decay of geometry at small scale, the
geometrizable part of the Universe appears as a sort
of sponge with fuzzy holes filled with a-geometric parts
all around (what one could call “the Space-Time Fuzzy
Sponge”). The holes in the sponge, or for those who
do not like the sponge image, the a-geometric compo-
nents of the Universe, are not expected to be quantized:
the number of quantal players needed to come close to
the classical regime seems to not be universal as quan-
tum super-fluids and so called SQUIDs (Superconduct-
ing QUantum Interference Devices) indicate (for an argu-
ment in the opposite direction, see e.g., [11]): the fact is
that non interacting quantum components can build very
large quantum objects whose geometry makes sense, but
at the macroscopic level.
Many statements by Heisenberg (see [60]) are quite
compatible with Corollary 1. However, Heisenberg comes
short in [60] of formulation that statement or a similar
one. What seems really new (and the only thing most
probably according to Arthur Fine) is the counterfac-
tual analysis approach to Corollary 1. This approach
reinforces the similarity of the loss of physical sense of
geometry at small enough scale with the fact that most
natural numbers make no physical sense.
The EPR-related part of the present paper aims at
helping kill the legend of non-locality of QM associated
to EPR (others have already began that process, but the
spread of the disease is huge). On the other hand (and
this transpires in the way so many people were ready
to accept the EPR-motivated strong non-locality state-
ments), there is (or seems to be) some sort of (weak)
non-locality of QM associated for instance to simple dou-
ble slits settings, wave mechanics and path integrals [61].
The decay of geometry at small enough scale may help
us understanding this still quite mysterious (weak) non-
locality. However, the best point might be that compre-
hension of QM becomes an acceptably impossible task.
Remark 18 (Counting non-locality properties)
To the direct contrary of the point of view that I defend,
some consider in fact that the (strong) non-locality of
QM associated to EPR and the (weak) non-locality of
QM as in double slits settings are the same and that the
strong-weak dichotomy that I have used here is meaning-
less. From what I understand from the conversation that
I had the chance of having with him, it seems to me that
Lev Vaidman is in that camp (of course, this did not
prevent the discussion from being very useful to me, with
lots of points of agreement and many of disagreement:
see also [13]).
7.2: Experimental test.
Reconsider the experimental setting for diffraction and
interferences with neutrons (see for example the review in
[62]) or other particles. Performing the experiment with
heavier and heavier nuclei, and then if needed more com-
plex objects, one can expect to see less and less interfer-
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ence as the approach to classicality builds up geometriza-
tion and predictability of the trajectories according to the
views defended on the basis of the decay of geometry at
small enough scale. However, geometrization could hap-
pen at once at some threshold value, possibly then with
hysteresis. I remark that the experiment that I propose
would test likely consequences of the decay of geometry
at small scale, rather than the decay itself or logically
provable consequences of it (but one should keep in mind
that the the decay of geometry may, but does not have
to, mean the decay of mathematization altogether).
7.3: Introducing wave pseudo-functions.
The quantum descriptors such as fields of wave func-
tions should depend on “about x and about t” rather than
on x and t, al the proper formalism to express that eludes
us at this (approximate) time. The truth is that pseudo
wave functions, or rather wave pseudo-functions, appear
to often be well approximated by usual wave functions,
since parts of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Field
Theories work quite fine.
Other forms of time destructions and geometry changes
or geometry weakening at about the Planck scale, under
extreme conditions or not, have appeared following ideas
initiated by de Witt and Wheeler [63], [64]: see in par-
ticular [65] and [66] which builds on non-commutative
geometry [67]: when these approaches come closest to
the simple one proposed here, they are epistemologically
most different from it, but the reader is entitled to her
or his own opinion on this matter.
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